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The International Division of Labor in Economists’ 
Field. Academic Subordination in Exchange for 
Political Prerogatives in Argentina 
Mariana Heredia ∗ 
Abstract: »Die internationale Arbeitsteilung im wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen 
Feld. Akademische Unterwerfung im Tausch gegen politische Privilegien in Ar-
gentinien«. Since the 1970s, economics has emerged as a global profession, 
with economists becoming main characters of the intellectual and political life 
in many countries. Inspired by Bourdieu, several analyses faced the challenge of 
“theorizing fields beyond the nation-state” (Buchholz 2016). Some scholars 
emphasized that internationalization entailed a growing asymmetry between 
dominant and dominated participants: the former acting as “exporters” and the 
latter as “importers” of ideas (Dezalay and Garth 2002). Others pointed out the 
process of “creative destruction” that accompanied the globalization of local 
fields (Fourcade 2006). Finally, still others noted the emergence of a new field 
of globalized experts and think tanks (Medvetz 2012). Through a socio-
historical depiction of economists in Argentina, we problematize the subordi-
nated role of peripheral economists. Rather than a dominant-dominated logic, 
we identify a new international division of labor. Based on more than 60 inter-
views with economists, archival research, and statistical analyses, this paper 
shows that while a dependent position in the global academic field reduced Ar-
gentinian economists’ theoretical autonomy, it gave them the scientific author-
ity that in turn paved the road to access very well-paid work as consultants and 
high-level public servants. 
Keywords: Global field, economists, Argentina, historical-sociology, experts, 
decision-making. 
1.   Introduction1 
Although social sciences and humanities have been presented as intellectual 
projects that transcend national frontiers engaging all human beings, they did 
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1  The author would like to warmly thank the editors and an anonymous reviewer for their 
enriching suggestions. I am also very grateful to Piroska Csúri for linguistic revisions and 
editing. 
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not evolve equally in every region. While in Western-central countries they 
tended to associate the history of white Western men to the history of humani-
ty, in the developing world, they appeared later and were considered a key 
ingredient to archiving self-consciousness and to helping these nations catch up 
with modernity. In the first half of the 20th century, economists aimed at 
providing technical tools for social diagnoses and progress planning accompa-
nying the expansion of welfare states. 
Surprisingly, both in the North and in the South, economists succeeded in 
eluding the fate of the decline of the State. Unlike with other professions, when 
public intervention was questioned with increased strength in the 1970s, the 
public and private authority of economists was reinforced. Since then, trained 
economists have forged a quasi-monopoly of legitimate opinion on macro-
economics and economic public policy, occupying the highest positions in 
government (Hallerberg and Wehner 2013; Hartmann 2006; Hira 2007; Savage 
and Williams 2008; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2017). As markets expanded, they 
were also called on to intervene in a great variety of domains (Caliskan and 
Callon 2010). 
Bourdieu’s field analysis has been invoked frequently in studying the rise of 
economists. Pierre Bourdieu (1985, 1993, 1997) defined a set of general rules 
that are characteristic of fields. In addition to constituting a space structured by 
a set of positions, what distinguishes a field is its relative autonomy, that is, the 
existence of ties of solidarity and conflict among its members. While members 
share a common belief in the value of this game and tend to conglomerate in a 
set of specific institutions, there are certain rules that regulate competition, one 
against the others, for the capital in play. 
Given that economics was at once a social science and an increasingly glob-
al profession, many studies faced the challenge of “theorizing fields beyond the 
nation-state” (Buchholz 2016). Some scholars stressed that internationalization 
entailed a growing asymmetry between dominant and dominated participants: 
the first acting as “exporters” and the second as “importers” of ideas (Dezalay 
and Garth 2002). Other analysts pointed out the process of “creative destruc-
tion” that accompanied the globalization of local fields (Fourcade 2006, 157). 
Finally, still others concluded that economists’ practices have changed so pro-
foundly that, instead of dealing with an academic or political field and the 
interaction between them, we can observe the emergence of a new field consti-
tuted by think tanks and full-time experts (Medvetz 2012). 
Research on the field of economics made it clear that the reconstruction of 
preexisting jurisdictions, norms and practices took locally specific forms. In her 
analyses of the Unites States, Fourcade (2009, 253) shows that “economists in 
this country rarely hold political positions.” Although economic ideas deeply 
permeated the organization of American society, economists have not partici-
pated in conducting its dominant institutions and “the emerging field [of 
economics in the US] evolved toward a model of ‘ivory-tower’ scholarship, 
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focused on high scientific claims and the assertion of disciplinary sovereignty” 
(ibid., 255). In most other countries, the situation was rather different: not only 
have many economists become members of the political and economic elites 
since the 1970s, it became difficult to identify differentiated professional pro-
files between those who participated in knowledge production, policy-making, 
and public debates on economic matters. 
Based on more than 60 interviews with economists,2 the content analysis of 
newspaper and journal articles spanning three decades, and available statistical 
data,3 this paper reconstructs the socio-history of economists in Argentina4 
through the following questions: To what extent does the integration to a global 
profession, but in a subordinate position, jeopardize the accuracy of the field 
theory to describe national settings? Does the rise of global economists run in 
parallel to the consolidation of local fields? Furthermore, is the notion of a 
global academic field the proper concept to characterize the practices of eco-
nomists and the interactions between dominant and dominated players in this 
global profession? 
Certainly the question is not brand-new. For those who studied economists 
at the level of the nation state, a modification was proposed to better calibrate 
the approach to the diversity of cases where it was employed. As the notion of 
a field has been forged to understand highly-integrated and structured spaces of 
practice (Becker 2009), certain authors warned that it could not be transposed 
into different national settings without due consideration. Several adjectives 
were employed to stress the distance between the original definition of a field 
and the observed phenomena. Observed fields could be ‘heteronomous,’ 
‘weak,’ ‘unstructured.’ Those who analyzed the academic profession from a 
global perspective (Gingras and Mosbah-Natanson 2010; Kirtchik 2012; Mon-
tecinos, Markoff and Alvarez-Rivadulla 2009) had to note the very dispropor-
tionate degree of integration of different national and linguistic academic 
                                                             
2  In the absence of any quantitative data on the Argentine economics job market, the availa-
ble studies and the qualitative survey produced here are, so far, the only sources to study 
the integration and practices of these professionals. The Consejo Profesional de Ciencias 
Económicas (CPCE, Professional Council of Economic Sciences) is the only existing profes-
sional association, although an overwhelming majority of its members are actually account-
ants. There are no specific studies by discipline. Neither the Department nor the Faculty of 
Economics at the University of Buenos Aires (the country’s most important university con-
sidering its long trajectory and its student enrollment) has systematic data on the profes-
sional insertion of their graduates. 
3  Space constraints prevent us from expanding further on the empirical foundations of our 
conclusions. For more detail on the Argentinian case, see Heredia (2015). 
4  Contrary to the analysis of Dezalay and Garth (2002) who only considered Latin American 
globalized economists after 1970, we examined the Argentinian economic profession in a 
larger historical and sociological scope. Previous studies on the Argentine case focused on 
specific groups, periods, or dimensions (e.g., Biglaiser 2009; Plotkin 2006; Neiburg 2006), all 
of which are integrated here. 
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communities in the leading roles: early on, the internationalization of econo-
mists was described as a process of Americanization. 
This paper proposes a different solution. Rather than qualifying the con-
sistency of the local academic field in Argentina or demonstrating the integra-
tion of its economists in a subordinate position in the global profession, this 
paper points out the reconfiguration of the economists’ field and the emergence 
of a new international division of labor. On the one hand, the global academic 
field, whose center is now unquestionably in the US, does not respond to a 
unified and self-operating dynamics. Not all participants are similar, nor do 
they perform the same daily practices. Their degree of academic engagement 
(in terms of material dependence, professional exclusivity, time span of partici-
pation, distinction criteria) can vary widely from one place to another. On the 
other hand, the integration of peripheral economists in the global field is not 
just a question of degree and, seen from the local scene, it can hardly be inter-
preted as subordinated or limited. It is true that a dependent position in the 
global academic field reduces theoretical autonomy. Nevertheless, it provides a 
certain authority that in turn paves the road to access very well-paid work as 
consultants and high-level public servants. In both cases, the integration in the 
global field serves to silence public criticism. 
Among globalized economists, instead of competing dominant and dominat-
ed groups, we identify different types of autonomy as well as cooperative ties 
between central and peripheral participants. If we define academic autonomy as 
the agency to openly contest conventional theory and produce original methods 
and knowledge, it is clear that Argentinian economists downshifted to a deval-
uated position. But if we take political autonomy as the capacity to intervene in 
the framing and fighting of social problems, their power was extraordinary, 
both from a historical and geographical perspective. The dominated should 
better be counted among those scattered local economists and politicians who 
could hardly compete with the academic, technical, and political capitals of 
globalized experts. 
That is precisely why Argentina presents a fruitful prospect for such a study. 
In addition to being one of the largest nations in Latin America, it brought forth 
several world-renowned economists who made important contributions to early 
economic debates. The Argentinian Raúl Prebisch was the intellectual and 
institutional leader of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) of 
the United Nations. Other Argentinian economists were also considered among 
the most original theoreticians of the mid-20th century (Love 1996). But the 
originality of Argentinian economic knowledge and the strength of its academ-
ia and public administration soon faded.5 During the second half of the 20th 
                                                             
5  Compared to other Latin-American countries, Argentina stands out as the nation with the 
longest and most conflictive relationship between universities and the government. Regard-
less of the nature of their political regimes, Mexico and Brazil have tended to secure a cer-
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century, contrary to other big Latin-American nations,6 Argentinian academic 
careers were rare, poorly paid, and with little incentives to publish in top inter-
national journals. These conditions did not reduce the prerogatives of ‘inde-
pendent’ economists. Trained in the US, strangers to political parties and the 
state administration, globalized economists formed teams that have played a 
crucial role in public discussion and policy-making since the 1970s. Under 
their influence and after several decades of instability, the country adopted 
revolutionary strategies to fight inflation and was one of the first to adopt far-
reaching market reforms. While other Latin American countries show very 
similar patterns, the weakness of Argentinian academic careers constitutes an 
extreme case of economists’ division of labor that enabled ‘winners to take it all.’ 
Considering the starting point, the conflictive trajectory and the final consol-
idation of global economists, Argentina constitutes a case of profound recon-
figuration of its local field and an archetype to analyze the emergence of a new 
international division of labor in economists’ global profession. In order to 
present the socio-history of economists in Argentina, this paper is organized 
into three sections. Each section retraces a phase in the transition from a state 
field of economists to a global field of professionals characterized by comple-
mentary ties between those who theorize and publish in the academic center 
and those who intervene authoritatively in the public and political local scene.  
2. The Growing Weakness of the National Academic Field 
of Economists 
2.1  Economic Sciences as a State Field 
Although both an undergraduate degree in accounting and a doctoral degree in 
economic sciences already existed as early as the beginning of the 20th century 
(Plotkin 2006), economists had to wait until World War I and the crisis of the 
1930s to gain impetus in Argentina. In 1925, the Oficina de Investigaciones 
Económicas (OIE, Office of Economic Research) was created at the National 
Bank, recruiting many of the best students and professors from the Faculty of 
Economic Sciences.  
                                                                                                                                
tain degree of ideological and financial autonomy for professors and researchers. This was 
also true of Chile until the violent intervention by Pinochet in the 1970s. While Argentina 
shares with Chile this last traumatic experience, its institutional instability dates much fur-
ther back to the 1930s (see Brunner and Barrios 1987).  
6  The permanent or recent consolidation of Academic careers in economics was observed by 
Babbs (2009) in Mexico, Loureiro (2009) in Brasil, and Montecinos (2009) in Chile. For these 
authors, the main problem for these local fields is the strong encouragement for interna-
tionalization rather than the scarcity of full-time researchers in economics. 
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The growing celebrity of Argentinian economic sciences was strongly asso-
ciated with Raúl Prebisch. This brilliant economist was trained at the Universi-
ty of Buenos Aires, where he developed his early academic career. As a public 
official, he was sent on mission to different countries and encouraged develop-
ing new ideas about economic dynamics and challenges in the new world. His 
analyses of Argentinian and Latin American economies were developed with a 
keen interest in other national experiences and in an active dialogue with col-
leagues in the US, Europe, and Latin America. Following the publication of 
several celebrated books by him in Spanish (Prebisch 1949, 1951), the Ameri-
can Economic Review printed one of his papers in 1959. 
Prebisch considered that conventional economic theory was unable to pin 
down the specificities of peripheral economies and their challenges and poten-
tials for socio-economic development. As the intellectual leader of ECLA, he 
encouraged new ways of understanding and conducting political economy in 
Latin America. But his influence spread in different directions, founding a 
long-lasting critique of the modernization paradigm.  
But Prebisch was not alone. According to Love (1996, 207), during the 
1950s and 1960s, Latin American economists made some of the most interest-
ing contributions to economic knowledge. Argentines such as Julio Olivera7 
and Aldo Ferrer8 played an important role in producing original ideas in eco-
nomic science and participating in intense international debates. 
Within the State administration and in regional international organizations, 
economists gained in number and influence by making diagnoses and assisting 
in developmental planning. One indicator of the rising demand for economists 
is the growing importance of the area of economics within the national cabi-
net,9 while another one concerns the centrality of public banks and the Instituto 
Argentino de Promoción del Intercambio (IAPI, Argentine Institute for the 
Promotion of Trade, created in 1946). Under the Presidency of Arturo Frondizi 
(1958-1962), the Consejo Federal de Inversiones (CFI, Federal Investment 
Council, created in 1959) and the Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo (CONADE, 
National Development Council, of 1961) came to centralize planning. In the 
1950s and 1960s, the process continued under successive civilian presidencies 
and military governments. 
                                                             
7  Julio Olivera is considered one of the founding fathers of the heterodox approach to infla-
tion. In English, see Olivera (1964, 1970, 1971). 
8  Among his most important contributions, see Ferrer (1956, 1963, 1977).  
9  In the early 20th century, Argentina had a Ministry of Finance and one of Agriculture. In 
1932, President Justo added the Ministry of Public Works. Although Juan Domingo Perón 
eventually dissolved the Ministry of Agriculture in 1947, he created separate ministries for 
the areas of Finance, Industry and Trade, adding Economic Affairs in his second term. The 
1955 dictatorship retained 5 ministries in the area (Economy, Finance, Industry, Commerce, 
and Public Works) and relaunched the agricultural ministry. 
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Argentinian economic sciences also developed through the creation and 
consolidation of specific associations and university degrees. In 1957, the Aso-
ciación Argentina de Economía Política (AAEP, Argentine Association of 
Political Economy) was founded in order to congregate economists nationwide 
and organize annual meetings. Economists of very different orientations signed 
the founding document (Fernández López 1998, 22). In 1958, the University of 
Buenos Aires sealed the independence of economics as a separate discipline by 
creating a specialized undergraduate degree. The main public universities in the 
provinces endorsed the initiative, and so did the first private universities. 
Somewhat later, the Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social (IDES, Insti-
tute for Economic and Social Development) and its journal Desarrollo 
Económico were founded, fostering dialogue among specialists. 
In this sustained expansion, the worth of an Argentinian economist was 
measured by his/her ability to elucidate local particularities and challenge the 
universalism of conventional theories. Regardless of whether they succeeded or 
not, the economists who were publishing in the 1960s and 1970s sought to 
come up with an original interpretation of the local economic reality. It is no 
coincidence that, despite their differences, most economists interviewed for this 
project manifested a great admiration for the work of Raúl Prebisch and Julio 
Olivera, who made a contribution to the international debate on the specificities 
of the ‘periphery’ and ‘developing economies.’ Many of the books written by 
economists at the time reaffirmed the will to propose a renewed interpretation 
of local reality (e.g., Diamand 1973; Villanueva 1972, 361). 
Economic sciences during this period were intertwined with other specialties 
dedicated to pursuing social progress. Economists worked alongside other 
professionals at universities, research centers, journals, and state agencies. For 
instance, on the Editorial Board of Desarrollo Económico, economists coexist-
ed side-by-side with sociologists and historians.10 It was also commonplace to 
see cross-disciplinary dialogue where sociologists and historians commented 
on the work of an economist and vice versa. Economists of the CFI and the 
CONADE participated jointly with other experts in diagnosis, planning, and 
implementation of public policies. 
Working together as colleagues at universities and state agencies not only 
guaranteed the coexistence of economists with other specialists, but also fos-
tered a degree of dialogue among them. According to the prosopography of the 
interviewed economists who had graduated in the 1960s, most of them were 
educated at public universities, especially at the University of Buenos Aires. 
Many started their careers at public banks or planning agencies. Several were 
disciples of Julio Olivera, participating in his reading seminars. Economists 
with opposing ideological inclinations such as Roberto Frenkel (heterodox) or 
                                                             
10  Researchers from different social sciences served on the Editorial Board, as evidenced by the 
information on the back cover of Desarrollo Económico 4(III), January-March 1964. 
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Carlos Rodríguez (orthodox) coincided as junior scholars at the same research 
center. Until the early 1970s, papers published in Desarrollo Económico also 
reflected the contributions of economists with clashing orientations.11 As im-
plied in the conventional concept of academic field, Argentinian economists 
showed some degree of uniformity in profiles, common integration in plural 
spaces with shared hierarchies and rules as well as the dynamics of a self-
operating system with a national scope. 
2.2  The Field Segmentation and the Empowerment of Global 
Economists 
Even in its most creative and expansive period, the national field of economics 
in Argentina suffered from job insecurity and insufficient material rewards. 
The advance of State economic intervention and the development of economic 
sciences went hand in hand with growing institutional instability. Between 
1930 and 1976, almost no Argentinian president completed the constitutionally 
mandated period of 6 years in office. As part of this intense turnover of gov-
ernments, the finance ministers were the most unstable of the entire national 
cabinet.  
As with other professions, economists’ activities were much more concen-
trated at State agencies than at universities or research centers. Although Ar-
gentine public universities were among the most prestigious and of highest 
enrollment in Latin America, university budgets and salaries were meager at 
best. In fact, full-time professors were very scarce and poorly paid.12 According 
to Fernández López (1998, 26), by the end of 1961 the Faculty of Economic 
Sciences of the Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) had only two full-time 
professors, who were thereafter joined by Olivera. It is only after the creation 
of the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET, 
National Scientific and Technological Research Council) in 1958 that we begin 
to see economists working as full-time scholars and researchers. But, once 
again, according to their testimonies, most of them found that such positions 
were scarce, and the material rewards were insufficient.  
In Argentina, the political instability and the relative inaction of the State fa-
cilitated the development and growing prestige of private initiatives. The pres-
tigious pioneering Di Tella Institute, created in 1958, revolutionized the rela-
                                                             
11  Not only did economists linked to the neoliberal reforms participate in the journal, experts 
from opposing theoretical and ideological visions engaged in debates, such as a controversy 
about the liberalization of the interest rate in the 1970s (cf. Feldman 1983, Fernández 
1983). Another dispute accompanied the publishing of a book (Ferrer 1977), discussed by 
several authors. 
12  According to Gertel (1997, 66), between 1960 and 1980, only 10% of university professors 
at the UBA were employed full-time. Biglaiser (2009, 78) states that before 1989 a full pro-
fessor at the UBA on average earned the equivalent of 250 US dollars per month. 
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tionship between entrepreneurship, international philanthropy, and culture in 
Argentina (Neiburg and Plotkin 2004). In 1964, the Fundación de Investi-
gaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas (FIEL, Foundation for Economic 
Research on Latin America) was created with the support of the Ford Founda-
tion and four traditional business corporations. FIEL’s continuity as well as the 
creation, a few years later, of the Instituto de Estudios Económicos de la Reali-
dad Argentina y Latinoamericana de la Fundación Mediterránea (IEERAL) 
and the Centro de Estudios Marcoeconómicos de Argentina (CEMA) were the 
outcome of initiatives by single companies or small groups of businessmen. 
They saw in these newly created think tanks an alternative means to participate 
in politics and revitalize liberal ideas.13 In this novel way, as in other countries 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Medvetz 2012), the interest of businessmen 
became crucial for the history of Argentine economics.  
Without downplaying the role of the demand and financial support from the 
business actors as part of the story, it is clear that changes in the economic 
profession were driven by the patronage of American organizations. As Deza-
lay and Garth (2002) pointed out, in order to ensure that the modernizing elites 
were ‘friends of America,’ the US government funded several philanthropic 
associations and think tanks. Substantial resources were provided to recruit and 
train professionals from the South and the East. Exchange programs with Latin 
American universities were created to host the best graduates at US postgradu-
ate programs. In turn, the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations shored 
up this initiative with their resources by funding institutions and projects in the 
countries of origin (Berman 1983). Additionally, neoliberal and neoconserva-
tive think tanks founded in the United States and Europe expanded southwards 
shortly after (Béland 2009, 44). 
Although at the beginning these experiences engaged just a minority, they 
not only contributed decisively to the survival of economists, but also to the 
reconfiguration of the professional field. First, American institutions signed 
agreements with public institutions that established certain conditions for for-
eign support. Soon, funds were destined to weaker organizations that did not 
impose any conditions.14 In the absence of any local planning or restriction, 
many of the best Argentinian graduates pursued postgraduate studies abroad 
thanks to scholarships awarded by US universities and American cooperation 
agencies. While some of them settled in the North, as officials at the World 
                                                             
13  When presenting FIEL, it was underlined that the purpose was creating a “liberal ECLAC” (De 
Pablo 1995, 173). The formal speech to announce the creation of the IEERAL-FM empha-
sized the intention to respond to the call of military authorities asking for civil collaboration 
(N’Haux 1993, 141). CEMA, with its Chicago-educated team, and with the backing of bankers 
and agrobusiness, is the think tank most consistently aligned with economic liberalism. 
14  The University of Tucumán and that of Cuyo were keener on becoming partners to the 
University of Chicago than the UBA. Therefore, American influence first took foot at mar-
ginal institutions and as a result of individual initiatives. 
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Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Biglaiser 2009, 79), those who 
returned to Argentina benefited from foreign funds enabling them to devote 
themselves to full-time research. 
These US strategies encouraged Argentine economists to become global. In 
the face of growing crises of central public institutions, several local organiza-
tions seeking prestige began to replicate the references, language, discussions, 
and methods used in the US. Argentinian economists realized that their materi-
al survival and professional reputation depended on participating in interna-
tional networks. 
This became particularly clear when a process of growing political radicali-
zation affected universities. Before and after the 1976 coup d’état, national 
universities became victims of extreme violence. Paramilitary and military 
groups launched a purge of higher education, unprecedented both in terms of 
scope and methods.15 Neither professors nor students in economic sciences 
were safe.16 Several economists interviewed went into exile or accepted to 
continue training or teaching abroad as a way to escape from danger. 
In the case of the UBA, the changes were remarkable. In 1977, a curriculum 
reform changed the title of the degree from ‘political economy’ to ‘economics.’ 
At that time, the humanities and social sciences contents in the curricula were 
replaced by more mathematics, a neoclassical theoretical emphasis, and a more 
professional orientation in undergraduate training (Beltrán 2005). While a 
higher degree of formalization of the arguments was prized, other theoretical 
currents, hitherto predominant, were condemned as ‘literature.’ 
Violence at public institutions contributed to strengthening the role of pri-
vate centers. Although the establishment of think tanks associated to the busi-
ness world and liberal orientation is the best known chapter of the privatization 
of economic sciences in Latin America, the creation of other centers made up 
of intellectuals and researchers from diverse orientations expelled from public 
universities was also made possible thanks to international funds. These expe-
riences included the Centro de Estudios del Estado y la Sociedad (CEDES, 
Center for the Study of the State and Society) and the Centro de Investi-
gaciones sobre el Estado y la Administración (CISEA, Center for Research on 
the State and Administration). 
                                                             
15  Kaufman (2001) details the direct military intervention in university affairs: changes in 
organizational structures, the incorporation of Catholic fundamentalists in key positions, 
severe ideological control, the expulsion of students, and the firing of teachers. 
16  Although it is estimated that university members were an important group among the 
victims of State terrorism, there is little data available on them. One of the existing lists 
mentions a total of eighty-three ‘disappeared’ students enrolled in this discipline at all pub-
lic and private universities. However, the Memory Committee of the Faculty of Economics of 
the UBA estimates that at least seventy-four of its members became victims of ‘forced dis-
appearance.’ 
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Regardless of their ideological differences, private centers were fully de-
pendent on their members’ global profile. For most of them, the principles of 
international recognition and the sources of external financing became a legiti-
mate and widespread support for the social sciences, and in particular for eco-
nomics. As a result, the segmentation of the Argentinian academic field in-
creased: as researchers were dispersed and even ‘hidden’ at private centers, 
neither universities nor state administrations served anymore as a setting for 
academic exchange.17 
The growing segmentation of the local academic field contributed to reduc-
ing the already meager intellectual autonomy. The want of stable and reasona-
ble material support for scholars, the violent repression at universities and 
scientific centers, the lack of freedom of speech and association, the scarcity of 
peer-exchange and evaluation dealt a severe blow to what had once been a 
vivid center of intellectual production. 
While Argentinian academics became weaker and more dependent on for-
eign founding and symbolic validation, new arenas opened up for expert inter-
vention. Many economists educated in the US who returned to Argentina 
gained increasing importance in public policy discussion and elaboration. 
While freedom of association and speech was suppressed and academic institu-
tions suffered a far-reaching purge, the global economists from FIEL, IEERAL, 
and CEMA justified their collaboration with the military’s economic policy in 
the name of reason. Not surprisingly, private heterodox research centers were 
called upon to play an important role during the return to democracy. A small 
minority within the profession, global economists – both those who supported 
and those who opposed the dictatorship – had participated in the technical and 
academic discussions that had taken place abroad. Some of them maintained 
fluid exchanges with colleagues at foreign universities or international organi-
zations. Ideas, contacts, teams: these economists had a lot to offer to the per-
plexed state authorities attempting to control inflation. 
3. The Fight against Inflation: An Opportunity for 
Efficiency over Truth 
3.1   Inflation: The Great Ally of Argentinian Economists 
Through the 1970s and 1980s the severity and persistence of inflation prompted a 
shift in the predominant themes studied by economists. Even though Argentina 
had been suffering from high levels of price increase since the 1940s (with an 
average rate of annual inflation of 28% between 1945 and 1974), the phenome-
                                                             
17  The AAEP and its annual meeting is the only exception we could identify. 
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non drew growing attention and gained relevance as it reached 400% in 1976. 
Between 1975 and 1991 no government managed to reduce the inflation rate to 
a single digit. Hence, inflation became a pressing concern both for economists18 
and policy makers. 
As seen earlier, the rise of global economists was not the result of the 
strength of the local academic field. On the contrary, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
different groups of experts tried to pursue their research activities with the 
support of private companies or foreign organizations. It was within these small 
groups that the battle against inflation was waged, setting economists apart 
from other experts and giving them the opportunity to gain prestige, visibility, 
and influence.  
Economists became the main characters in this fight, which reveals the po-
litical autonomy they had conquered. The principal distinction was between 
heterodox and orthodox economists, a categorization far from exhaustive and 
exclusive, since there were numerous intermediate cases and examples of con-
versions.19 However, from the 1980s on, this opposition emerged as a pivotal 
distinction. By the end of the last dictatorship in 1983, economists began to be 
labeled with one of these terms even if they had once been considered as repre-
senting alternative and opposing approaches. The notion of ‘heterodoxy’ ap-
pears less as a choice than as a forced brotherhood against a common adver-
sary. Though the press assumed a strong continuity between interventionist 
economists and heterodoxy, the qualitative study of specialized articles shows a 
significant division. In the new generation of economists, the thematic shift 
from development to inflation went hand in hand with a major transformation 
of the rhetoric and modes of reasoning: equations, tables, and curves proliferated. 
The international scenario played in favor of the orthodox-heterodox antag-
onism in the sense that it intensified the segmentation of the national field. As 
                                                             
18  My analysis of the conference papers presented at the AAEP and articles published in Desar-
rollo Económico through the period reveals that this phenomenon aroused particular inter-
est. That becomes clear when we compare texts whose titles and/or descriptors included the 
word “inflation” with those that focused on “development.” In the case of presentations, the 
ones including the word “development” went from 11% in 1964-1975 to 8% in 1976-1980, 
and to 5% in 1981-1990. Those examining inflation climbed from 10% in 1964-1975 to 
21% in the following periods. The decline in analyses focusing on productive sectors is also 
interesting: they represented 42% of the total in 1964-1975, and dropped to less than 22% 
in the last two periods. Papers show similar trends: those focusing on development de-
creased from 43% in 1958-1975 to less than 10% in the following periods, while those 
dealing with inflation increased from 4% in 1958-1975 and 5% in 1976-1980 to 9% in 
1981-1990. The relevance of inflation is even greater if we concentrate on economists en-
gaged in full-time research. 
19  Note the following significant phenomenon: the contrast appears in the 1980s and 1990s in 
both the public and political spheres. Earlier, in the 1970s, one could read about “liberal” 
intellectuals and “monetarist” economists, in contrast to a wide variety of “structuralists,” 
“populists,” “ECLAs,” “developmentalists,” “Marxists,” and “Keynesians.” 
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inflation had been instituted since the second half of the 1970s as a core subject 
in economic research (Nelson 1989, 11), specialists in remote regions joined 
efforts to understand it. Fighting inflation demanded increasingly sophisticated 
approaches and a growing professional investment in public-policy discussions 
and its elaboration. Both in Mexico and Brazil, or Chile and the US, the dis-
tinction between heterodox and orthodox approaches got inscribed in institu-
tional structures. But it could be misleading to consider these groups as domi-
nant and dominated participants of a unified academic field. At least in 
Argentina, economic experts were already organized into two separate camps, 
each of them citing different sets of authors and distinct bodies of scientific 
literature, cultivating ties with specific foreign universities, and acceding to 
different sources of funds (Neiburg 2006; van Gunten 2016). It was the public 
and political sphere where the competition played out. 
As the rise of the inflation controversy empowered global economists, it 
produced a profound transformation in the profession. On the one hand, de-
bates on exchange rates, debt, financial systems, and inflation became matters 
for specialists. Economists became the legitimate voices who could make pro-
nouncements on these matters; political and union representatives were no 
longer entitled to speak on these subjects. On the other hand, far from being 
limited to specialized forums, the confrontation between specialists acquired an 
increasingly public and political dimension. Economists began to participate in 
public debates and to attain visibility outside their disciplinary spaces.20 
In this expanded sphere, the various orientations of economic sciences were 
not equally represented. According to Camou (2007), professional economists 
tripled their interventions in the press between 1985 and 2005, while graduates 
of foreign universities and members of think tanks replaced the representatives 
of civil society and political organizations in the media. There was a strong 
association between professional profiles and ideological orientations. Econo-
mists highly critical of State intervention were more active, maintaining en-
gaged relations with different social partners. While heterodox centers only 
accepted funds from international organizations, other centers were financed 
through contributions from large private companies.  
Regarding the press, most liberal economists did not only take the initiative 
to intervene in the public and political arenas taking the offensive, but also 
instated the pedagogical and imperative rhetoric associated with the figure of 
the economist. According to the directors of the economic sections of the main 
newspapers Página/12, Clarín, and La Nación, “the heterodox” tended to be 
“more honest” and encouraged collective reflexivity, while “the orthodox” 
                                                             
20  For a long-term analysis of the framing of inflation as a social problem in the Argentinean 
press and the growing importance of experts, see Heredia and Daniel (2017).  
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were more assertive and quick to “send signals to the market.”21 For “the or-
thodox,” objections to market economy could only arise from a total ignorance 
of “the [economic] fundamentals.” The question for them was not so much 
whether to tell the truth or not, but rather how to dominate effectively the 
economy. 
While heterodox and orthodox economists paraded through the economic 
offices of the government trying – fruitlessly – to curb inflation, the fragility of 
the macroeconomic order created a new social demand for economic 
knowledge. The public space became an arena of permanent communication 
between economic officials, financial columnists, and society, while, within the 
confines of an increasingly professionalized media, a sharper distinction was 
established between the economy and other public concerns. The prosperity of 
speculative activities also provided great rewards to those familiar with eco-
nomic calculations.22  
3.2  Stabilization Plans: Political Success, Academic Effects 
In this context, the economic authorities acquired a completely unprecedented 
presence compared to other ministries. In quantitative terms, while since the 
1930s other ministers have had an average of two daily mentions in newspapers 
during the week they took office, the Ministers of Economy climbed from two 
mentions in the 1970s to six in the 1980s, seven in the 1990s, and twelve in the 
2000s. The character of this public interest also changed: while in the first 
decades of the century the descriptions were limited to the ceremonies, from 
the 1970s on ministers of economy have appeared in special features, inter-
views, articles on the reactions prompted by their appointment at home and 
abroad, even cartoons have been made of economist personae. Positioned at the 
top of the State hierarchy, in critical moments, the economic ministers drew 
equal or even more attention than presidents (Heredia and Gené 2009). 
At the same time, as one of the most important challenges for economic au-
thorities was to conquer or retain investor confidence (Schneider 1998), the 
Ministers of Economy were evaluated daily, especially by the financial mar-
kets. Both in the debates of candidates for the Ministry and in their appoint-
ment and crucial decisions, the authorities of international credit organizations, 
US representatives and foreign bank officials manifested in the media their 
evaluation of the experts’ credentials and trajectories. On the one hand, this 
                                                             
21  Based on the author’s interviews with the directors of the economic sections of La Nación 
(October 30, 2002), Ámbito Financiero (March 6 and 21, 2003), Página/12 (December 6, 
2004), and Clarín (December 12 and 28, 2002). 
22  According to a press article of 1991, financial activities had become, in the preceding years, 
a source of a particularly attractive professional salary: while the monthly salary of an un-
skilled laborer was estimated at about 200 pesos, the average wage for a stock trader to-
taled 5000 pesos (Ámbito Financiero, April 11, 1991, 4). 
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growing importance of external validation reinforced the association between 
global, “realistic,” and serious professionals promoted by these external ob-
servers and by the press. On the other hand, ambitious economists could clearly 
see that a successful professional career needed powerful foreign allies and 
strong engagement with public problem-solving. 
With inflation continuing on the rise, governments granted more and more 
prerogatives to their Ministers of Economy, whose experiments gained in radi-
calism and augmented collateral effects. But the Ministers were not alone: not 
only could they designate large teams, they also counted with the advice of 
their former American professors and that of foreign officials from international 
organizations. Even if many controversies remain open, most historians agree 
that the stabilization plan adopted by Minister Martínez de Hoz in 1978 and 
inspired by a brand new theory – “the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments” – from the University of Chicago,23 provoked a profound productive 
crisis and an unparalleled increase of external sovereign debt. Later, the adop-
tion of the Austral plan developed by the heterodox Minister Juan Vital Sour-
rouille, who counted with the financial and technical assistance of foreign 
institutions,24 led to hyperinflation in 1989. 
At last, market reforms and the Convertibility Plan25 of 1991 gave “the” 
economists the credit for having averted inflation in Argentina. While the 
1989-1990 crisis condemned the heterodox specialists to oblivion, the ability of 
the allegedly orthodox Domingo Cavallo’s team in stabilizing prices and boost-
ing growth gave the Minister specifically, and “the orthodox” in general, an 
enormous prestige. The consolidation was not only ideological; structural re-
forms and the stabilization of macroeconomic variables led to the consolidation 
of orthodox institution and the expansion of economists’ activities. 
As in the US (Dezalay and Garth 2002), upon their political success, the or-
thodox economists reinforced their position at research centers and universities. 
On the one hand, think tanks and private research centers created in the 1990s 
(such as CIPPEC, Center for the Implementation of Public Policies for Equity 
and Growth, or Sophia Foundation) reproduced mainstream economics, as their 
                                                             
23  As our interviewees recognized and was also noted by Novaro and Palermo (2003) and de 
Pablo (1999), the stabilization plan of 1978 was inspired by Frenkel and Johnson (1976), 
Johnson (1977), Kreinen and Officer (1978). 
24  Elaborated with the assistance of ECLA economists and other experts from the heterodox 
network, the Austral plan was discussed with officials from the International Monetary 
Found, the US Treasury, and the US Government. In addition to our interviews, see Neiburg 
(2006). 
25  The Convertibility Plan constitutes a singular case for the global logic of importation and 
exportation of ideas. Elaborated by global economists, its formulation rejected certain prin-
ciples of the Washington Consensus and powerful foreign and local actors (the IMF, the US 
government, most big businessmen in Argentina) resisted its adoption. Nevertheless, its later 
success in curbing inflation turned it into an internationally recommended recipe celebrated 
by its former opponents. See Heredia (2015) and Heredia and Nemiña (2017). 
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own members admitted, merely adapting it to the preferences professed by their 
international sponsors. International standards and eclecticism were even clearer 
in consulting. According to Beltrán and Strauss (2012), these firms have shown 
a remarkable growth since the 1990s. On the other hand, pluralism was on the 
retreat at universities. The biggest changes were not concentrated at the UBA, 
but rather at other public and private institutions. The public universities of 
Tucumán and La Plata got consolidated as neoclassical poles, with newly-
created elite private universities following suit (García de Fanelli 1997). In 
fact, earlier research centers – such as the Di Tella Institute and CEMA – were 
transformed into spaces for undergraduate and graduate training. In 1988, Saint 
Andrew’s High School founded a university largely focused on economics and 
business. These institutions built their reputation on reproducing locally the 
curricula, references, and validation methods of the most prestigious American 
universities. In many cases, they signed partnership agreements with foreign 
institutions to validate abroad their locally granted titles. 
Created to satisfy a growing demand, private universities came to occupy an 
increasingly important position within the system of higher education in eco-
nomics both for the higher and middle classes. In 2010, while private universi-
ties represented 16% of student enrollment, their share of those graduating with 
degrees in economics was 30%. The UBA had suffered a considerable throw-
back. In 1982, of all the degrees in the country, this university produced 41% 
of the graduates in different branches of economic sciences (business admin-
istration, economics, and accounting), but 62% of the country’s graduates in 
economics proper. By 2010, these figures dropped to 16% and 39%, respective-
ly.26 The expansion and specialization of economics was noteworthy at the 
graduate level. By the end of 2000, there were more than 70 postgraduate de-
grees (specializations, master’s degrees, and doctorates) in economics or ap-
plied economics only within the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires; a number 
that surpassed all other degrees in social sciences combined.27 
The effect on the new generation was clear. In my interviews during the early 
2000s, most young economists expressed their conformity with the decisions 
taken since 1989, in particular with regard to economic liberalization and con-
vertibility. Instead of defining themselves as heterodox or orthodox, they pre-
sented themselves as experts in the labor market, energy, commodities, finance, 
etc. The theoretical distinction, which was so vital for the middle generation, 
was no longer relevant. Younger economists have been educated in more 
Americanized programs, in a context of geopolitical homogeneity, integrating a 
much more market-oriented job market. 
                                                             
26  Compiled by the author based on a database from the National Secretary of University Policies. 
27  Based on internet information on graduate programs offered by public and private universities. 
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4. Uncoupled Academic Claims and Professional Practices 
4.1  The Multi-Positioned Profession and the Erosion of Borders 
At the beginning of the 21st century, neither did the national state quasi-
monopolize the training, recruitment, or promotion of economists, nor did its 
agencies (universities, national banks, planning agencies) define the limits 
between differentiated professional careers. The rise of economics went hand 
in hand with the ubiquity of liberal economic conceptions and the growing 
multi-positionality of these experts. The notion of multi-positionality was pro-
posed by Boltanski (1973) to describe the profile of dominant professors at the 
Institute of Political Sciences of Paris. Reconstructing their curriculum vitae in 
great detail, he determined that many of them occupied in parallel important 
positions in different organizations. According to the French author, this con-
figuration did not only increase their personal social capital, but also guaran-
teed a certain coordination of these specialized spaces.  
Although multi-positionality was certainly the main trait of the elite of Ar-
gentine economists, it also comprised the profession as a whole, as indicated by 
an early finding of our research. While our initial sample of interviewees aimed 
at representing economists of different profiles, the reconstruction of their 
trajectories quickly showed that most of them did not have a single core of 
professional specialization. In fact, whether simultaneously or in succession, 
most economists worked as consultants, professors, public officials, experts for 
international organizations, chief executive officers, traders, or researchers. 
Certainly, the government was still a source of employment and distinction. 
Although economists who worked full time throughout their lives for the public 
administration were considered ‘second-rate’ professionals, the ‘brilliant ones’ 
were still supposed to acquire experience in policy-making, but only in passing 
through. This double standard, also observed by Loureiro in Brazil (2009, 126), 
encouraged ambitious professionals to develop strong ties with international 
agencies, gain visibility in the press, and cultivate strategic relations with poli-
ticians and businessmen. Those who had decided to become full-time researchers 
relying on public funds not only settled for earning modest salaries, they were 
usually accused of sinking into mediocrity without exploiting the challenges 
presented by public discussion and public decision-making. According to the 
testimonies of young professionals, for highly motivated economists, teaching 
and doing research at universities were seen as a transitory shelter between two 
periods of high public engagement or as a hobby to be exercised part-time.  
Contrary to the early phase of the discipline described above, the new eco-
nomic profession was more tolerant towards career-diversity than towards 
theoretical or ideological pluralism. As we asked our interviewees about how 
the world of economists was composed in Argentina, mainstream economists 
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recognized that stock traders, businessmen, corporate representatives, and 
speculators of various kinds honored the fundamental principles of the disci-
pline and could legitimately claim the title of economists, although they des-
pised those who, sometimes from outside but mostly from inside the discipline, 
questioned the universal and virtuous character of globalization and market 
economy. 
Instead of a group of scholars engaged in the same academic game, other 
shared and explicit rules organized the field of economists. Most professionals 
valued foreign training; they associated the most globalized economists with 
the most distinguished ones. For them, economists could participate in different 
spaces, with a diversity of partners and objectives. Claiming an authority ini-
tially legitimized by a specific training, their reputation was less based on their 
scientific contribution or on their intellectual creativity than on the trust they 
received from the media or other powerful allies and on the efficiency they 
could demonstrate in problem solving. 
4.2  Academics as Alibi 
A badly paid, part-time activity and less challenging than in the North, academics 
did not lose its symbolic weight in Argentina. Most of my interviewees at-
tributed huge importance to their PhD training (especially if obtained abroad). 
They enjoyed describing in detail their academic experiences as students at 
prestigious foreign institutions. Ministers of Economy in the 1990s insisted 
again and again on their authority as experts in order to ward off criticism. 
They accused their opponents of ignorance, intimidated journalists by ridicul-
ing their lack of mathematical skills, and evoked repeatedly their foreign expe-
riences and their international networks in order to reinforce their positions.28 
But the stereotype of the economist was not an invention of these professionals. 
Those who sided with them contributed to producing this public image. When 
presenting economic experts, media articles noted carefully the foreign creden-
tials of their invited columnists. Academic degrees received similar attention as 
news items reconstructed the trajectory of a public official or a candidate. Such 
educational background and credentials enabled experts to present themselves 
as impartial representatives of science and reason, even though the funding for 
the economic knowledge they produced after their theses, as well as the recog-
nition, came mostly from non-academic organizations, lacking any procedure 
of scientific validation. 
                                                             
28  Many examples can be cited: Cavallo accused members of Congress of ignorance when 
presenting the Convertibility Plan to the National Congress in March 1991; the journalists I 
interviewed confessed being afraid of making questions to ministers and officials of the 
Central Bank for fear of being publicly humiliated for their lack of training in economics. 
Articles in the press and political reviews insisted on the foreign degrees of the economic 
authorities. 
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The distance between academic claims and professional practices, uncov-
ered by the socio-history of the economists’ field, did not only compromise 
individual careers. It engaged the very condition of knowledge-plurality and 
the legitimacy of interpretations. In fact, the recent unification of economics 
occurred at the expense of its institutional and intellectual ties with other per-
spectives and (social) sciences. At present, many private universities offer 
degrees in economics, but not in sociology, anthropology, or history. Most 
private centers only develop a research agenda tailored to the requirements of 
the effective demand. Becoming a market profession, economics gained auton-
omy from universities and public research funding at the price of satisfying 
short-term demands for training and data production. At the same time, the 
divide between disciplines was such that most economists interviewed no longer 
considered Desarrollo Económico an economics journal, and reckoned that a 
good paper was to be submitted to an international English-language journal, 
where economists debated with high levels of mathematical sophistication, 
eluding dialogue with other social sciences. All my interviewees recognized 
that, except for the daily press, there was no professional arena in Argentina 
where to confront different interpretations and observe expert discussion. In the 
absence of any local criteria of scientific honesty and worth, it was impossible 
to distinguish the authority of a professor from that of a lobbyist when both 
held foreign degrees and participated in a debate in the press. 
In the 1990s, even if more qualified teaching staff was recruited and sup-
ported by new elite universities, this tiny minority of professors could hardly 
overcome the profound local segmentation. On the one hand, they were recruit-
ed after completing their PhDs at US universities and frequently lacked profes-
sional ties with their local counterparts. On the other hand, most economists at 
less prestigious universities were just part-time professors, while devoting their 
main professional efforts to other activities. Segmentation was clear in teaching 
and in research. An analysis of syllabi shows that, in the courses they taught, 
economists tended to mention only foreign-authored papers or those written by 
members of their own teams. The same occurred with the bibliographies cited 
in their articles: global economists avoided referencing local research on the 
same issues but seen from different perspectives, a practice already observed 
by other researches comparing orthodox and heterodox publications (Glötzl 
and Aigner 2015). 
The huge public investment in public universities and the National Research 
Council in the first decade of 21st century had the potential to encourage discipli-
nary integration.29 Despite these efforts, dominant economists preferred to keep 
their distance from full-time academic activities. Contrary to their colleagues 
                                                             
29  According to Albornoz and Gordon (2011, 37), taking into account all disciplines, between 
2003 and 2010, the number of researchers at CONICET increased by 67% and fellowships for 
PhD students grew by 242%. 
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in other social sciences, great numbers of economists are now employed by 
private universities and research centers, but very few are researchers of the 
CONICET, the national research organization.30 Most mainstream economists 
suspected the CONICET of supporting heterodox perspectives, especially 
because, compared to other economics-related activities, the local academia 
implied poorer incomes and professional marginality. 
Such segmentation creates a problem of accountability. While US PhD pro-
grams endow their graduates with lifetime, quasi-prophetic credentials that 
entitles them to participate authoritatively in public debates or decision-making 
processes on a wide range of subjects, without a local academic field that could 
consecrate them, their expertise rides solely on the prestige of their degree, the 
support of powerful allies, and not on peer evaluation. As an economist of the 
older generation pointed out ironically, “inputs have become more important 
than outputs.” 
5.  Conclusion 
As in most Latin American countries, economics in Argentina has undergone a 
profound change. While in the 1950s economists were part of an integrated and 
inward-looking discipline focused on academic life and the State administra-
tion, in the 1990s, economics became a much more disintegrated, hierarchical, 
and outward-looking profession, assisting both public and private organizations 
in decision-making. Even if the mentioned outcomes can also be observed in 
other Latin American countries, Argentina still represents a crucial example, 
since its process of professional reconfiguration was particularly conflictive, 
and in the end the ‘orthodox’ managed to reduce their competitors to very 
marginal and underrated positions. The possibilities for alternative economic 
knowledge production and for a professional career in local academia and the 
country’s public administration were slim, given that these options were sym-
bolically discredited and materially ill-remunerated. 
The notion of a national academic field can be a useful tool to describe the 
first period in the history of the economics profession in Argentina. This con-
cept implies structured spaces with explicit and specific rules, a configuration 
that usually characterized academia and the public administration in many 
countries between the 1930s and the 1960s. These fields and rules served as a 
                                                             
30  According to a study by Beigel and Gallardo (2014, 3), in the early 2010s, economists repre-
sented 8.5% of all researchers in social sciences and humanities, far behind anthropologists, 
philosophers, sociologist, and literary scholars. Compared with their counterparts in other 
social sciences, economists retained the highest percentage of PhDs abroad and especially in 
the US (ibid., 8). Similarly, they tended to develop their activities in “associations,” outside 
the universities and the CONICET (ibid., 10). 
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basis for founding the legitimacy of scientists and government officials, and in 
particular that of economists dedicated to producing knowledge, diagnoses 
about the country and elaborating policies. Once State jurisdiction, explicit 
norms, and State-centered practices weakened, economists looked for other 
sources of legitimation and support. Market and global exchanges were gradu-
ally introduced, becoming dominant in the 1990s. 
At least for Argentina, since the 1970s, the notion of a national academic 
field no longer describes accurately the organization and development of econ-
omists’ practices, nor does the notion of a stratified global field of dominant 
and dominated participants account properly for the new configuration of this 
profession. In the light of the Argentine case, the notion of a global field of 
economists can still remain useful if construed in a broad sense,31 underlining 
the profound changes registered in economists’ practices and stressing the 
resulting international division of expert labor. 
This paper added the Argentinean case to other analyses that have demon-
strated the profound transformation experienced by local academic fields. At 
the same time, we concurred with other studies that have stressed that peripheral 
economists tend to function more as receptors than as active producers of ideas. 
Nevertheless, our goal goes beyond the observation of a stratified flow of ideas 
and capitals in the global academic field.  
Our strongest hypothesis here is that the notion of a global academic field 
does not describe properly the practices of economists and the interactions 
between dominant and dominated players in this global profession. In the vein 
of Dezalay and Garth (2002) and Medvetz (2012), we stressed the emergence 
of a new configuration where core and peripheral economists perform different 
roles. On the one hand, at US Ivy League universities, scholars enjoy broad 
intellectual autonomy, develop an enriching full-time academic career, and 
endow on their students a symbolic capital highly valued worldwide. On the 
other hand, in different local settings, peripheral economists have seen their 
margins for criticism and theoretical creativity reduced, while engaging only in 
part-time academic labors, but they possess outstanding capacities to intervene 
in the public and political sphere. 
Rather than dominant or dominated players of the same academic field, 
presently the economists’ field does not constitute a unified and self-operating 
space: it is composed of a center of academic players and a periphery of con-
sultants, public-discussants, and policy-makers. Each part of the field has spe-
cific rules and types of autonomy, but they share ties of solidarity, a common 
belief in the value of the game at play and – as a result of several decades of 
consolidation – established positions and principles of (segmented) internal 
struggle. At least in Argentina, academic institutions – scattered and weak due 
                                                             
31  This would not be the choice of authors such as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) or even 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012), who have proposed a stricter definition of a field. 
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to years of violence and neglect by the State – could hardly question the bases 
of a professional claim that reduced academics to the struggle for a reputation 
and an organizational power completely detached from respect for pluralism 
and intellectual creativity.  
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